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How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, 
which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, 
though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it.  
 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Adam Smith, 1790).  
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
At the very core of economics lies the question of scarcity, or “how society makes 
choices concerning the use of limited resources” (Stiglitz, 1988). To achieve utility-
maximization from a limited set of resources, traditional economic models assume 
that individuals actively pursue their material self-interest. The Homo Oeconomicus 
theory has shown to be useful in many cases. However, substantial evidence has been 
generated that suggests that other motives such as altruism, fairness,and morality 
profoundly affect the behavior of many individuals. People may punish others who 
have harmed them or reward others who have helped them, sacrificing their own 
wealth (Camerer et al., 2004). People donate blood or organs without being 
compensated; they donate money to charitable organizations.  During wartime many 
individuals volunteer to join the armed forces and are willing to take high risks as 
soldiers (Elster, 2007). Citizens vote in elections incurring higher private costs than 
benefits, and people show greater tax compliance than a traditional economics-of-
crime model would predict (Torgler, 2007). Individuals also help others in many 
situations in the workplace (Drago and Garvey, 1998). In many experiments subjects 
have shown to care about aspects such as fairness, reciprocity, and distribution. 
Ultimatum experiments have shown that the modal offer is (50, 50) and that the mean 
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offer is somewhere around (40, 60). This also demonstrates that the smaller the offer, 
the higher the probability that the offer will be rejected (Ochs and Roth, 1989; Roth, 
1995). We also observe helping to be a key element in our work environment “Within 
every work group in a factory, within any division in a government bureau, or within 
any department of a university are countless acts of cooperation without which the 
system would break down. We take these everyday acts for granted, and few of them 
are included in the formal role prescriptions for any job” (Katz and Kahn, 1966). 
 Individuals compare themselves to their environment and care greatly about 
their relative position, which can influence individual choices. Thus, not only is the 
absolute level of an individual‟s situation important (e.g. income), but also the relative 
position. Researchers have included the concept of interdependent preferences to 
allow for social comparison (e.g., Becker, 1974; Easterlin, 1974; Scitovsky, 1976; 
Schelling, 1978; Pollak, 1976; Frank, 1985; Clark, Frijters and Shields, 2008; Akerlof 
and Yellen, 1990). Frank (1999) emphasizes that research provides “compelling 
evidence that concern about relative position is a deep-rooted and ineradicable 
element in human nature” (p. 145).  
Thus, several approaches try to take into account the deviation of a self-
interested model by extending the motivation structure (e.g. Becker, 1974; Rabin, 
1993; Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Sobel, 2005; Frey, 1997). In general, 
Thaler (2000) stresses that the Homo Economicus will evolve to Homo Sapiens: “As 
economists become more sophisticated, their ability to incorporate the findings of 
other disciplines such as psychology improves” (p. 140).   
Despite the large number of studies in this area, there is hardly any empirical 
evidence that demonstrates that interdependent preferences and pro-social behavior 
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matter in extreme situations such as life-and-death situations. This paper tries to 
rectify this shortcoming by exploring this question using data from the sinking of the 
RMS Titanic, the most recognizable maritime disaster in history. While the 
unexpected loss of life from this tragedy was indeed sorrowful, the event provides us 
with data that help us to better understand decision-making processes under extreme 
pressure. Individuals are forced to make choices that affect their probability of 
surviving. What makes the event interesting for research is that it is a contained and 
controlled event, much like a natural field experiment would be designed, wherein the 
majority of the exogenous factors are controlled and the endogenous factors can be 
tested and investigated. The environmental or situational conditions were identical for 
every person on board the Titanic. This allows us to explore behavioral reactions to an 
external shock, as well as to investigate people‟s behavior under scarcity. The issue of 
scarcity or shortage arose, as there existed a severe lack of lifeboats. The Titanic 
carried only 20 lifeboats adequate for 1178 people (or 53% of the passengers on 
board). The problem was exacerbated further by the panicked deck crew, who began 
launching lifeboats that had not been loaded to capacity. This meant an excess 
demand situation as people wishing to survive had to compete with others on board 
for a place on the lifeboats. A failure to secure a seat virtually guaranteed death as the 
average water temperature of the surrounding ocean was approximately 2 degrees 
Celsius (35 Fahrenheit). Anyone left in the freezing water would quickly succumb to 
hypothermia and drown. We can expect a certain level of agreement among those 
already in a lifeboat and those still waiting to board a lifeboat to limit the lifeboat to 
its maximum safe load to avoid the boat falling into serious danger (Martin, 1978). In 
addition, we can largely exclude that potential helping behavior could be motivated 
by future reciprocity, a key element in the helping literature (e.g. Gouldner, 1960; 
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Batson et al., 1979). A life-and-death situation can be seen as a “one-shot game”. 
Moreover, previous research has shown that legitimacy affects helping behavior. 
Legitimate need elicits more help than does illegitimate need (e.g. own laziness) 
(Schwartz and Fleishman, 1978; Berkowitz, 1969). In our case, people were 
confronted with an “external shock” which in a substantial manner helps to control 
legitimacy. 
 Thus, the intention of the paper is to investigate the decisions made under 
these extreme conditions and see if the survival outcomes fit with the literature on 
interdependent preferences. The key question is whether we are able to observe social 
norms, fairness and social preferences in a life or death situation. 
 
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
Previous studies have explored the link between fairness and shortage using survey 
data. In telephone surveys of randomly selected residents of two Canadian 
metropolitan areas, Kahneman et al. (1986) has shown that people consider the use of 
prices to eliminate the excess of demand to be unfair. This is consistent with the 
observation that firms do not adjust prices and wages as often as traditional economic 
theory would suggest. Moreover, we also observe formal laws that penalize vendors 
who take advantage of shortages by increasing prices for water, fuel and other 
necessities after a natural disaster (Camerer et al., 2004).  Frey and Pommerehne 
(1993) and Savage and Torgler (2008) replicated the study using European samples, 
and found similar results. In a shortage situation an allocation process in line with 
tradition (first-come, first-served) is perceived to be fairest, followed by 
administrative allocation procedures. However, in contrast to these studies, which 
 6 
consider attitudes we explore behavioral consequences of excess demand in a life-
and-death situation.  
Our research focus is closely linked to the question in line with the traditional 
economic approach, whether people behave according to the notion “every man for 
himself” or whether a “helping hand” effect can be observed. Interestingly, the 
willingness to help others in such situations is not uncommon. Perlow and Weeks 
(2002) stress that helping behavior is required within organizations for increased 
efficiency, flexibility, learning and innovation: “Therefore, it has never been more 
important for us to understand why people help each other at work and why they 
don‟t” (p. 343). Shotland and Stebbins (1983) refer to two lines of thoughts: firstly an 
“altruism school” with the premise that people have a need (innate or acquired) to 
help others in need; secondly a “hedonistic base” that suggests that people weigh the 
benefits and costs to themselves to reach the decision to help or not (p. 36). The 
second one is close to a traditional economic approach.  
 Helping behavior is not only linked to altruism (Piliavin and Charng, 1990), 
but also to reciprocity or exchange (Oberholzer-Gee, 2007; Fehr et al., 2002; Henrich, 
2004). The idea of reciprocity is helping those who have helped us. Exchange not 
only focuses on direct reciprocity but also on expectations that lead to solidarity and 
indirect reciprocity in more anonymous settings such as, helping lost tourists 
(Rabinowitz et al., 1997). However, as discussed in the introduction, in the case of the 
sinking of the Titanic, we are able to exclude such motivation due to the nature of the 
event studied.  
Altruistic motivation has been defined as the desire or motivation to enhance, 
as the ultimate goal, the welfare of others even at a net welfare loss to oneself 
(Batson, 1992; Elster, 1996). An additional definition of an altruistic act is “an action 
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for which an altruistic motivation provides a sufficient reason” (Elster, 1996). 
However, altruistic behavior is often framed described as being somewhat selfish. It is 
stressed that what appears to be motivated by a concern for others is often ultimately 
driven by selfish motives (Piliavin and Charng, 1990). The differentiation between 
motivation and act is useful, as identifying altruistic motivation is problematic. For 
example, a so-called “warm glow effect” can be observed when people give. Giving 
makes people feel good. Piliavin and Charng (1990) when summarizing the literature 
refer to a “paradigm shift” that emphasizes the importance of altruistic behavior: “The 
central point we attempt to make in this review is that the data from sociology, 
economics, political science, and social psychology are all at least compatible with the 
position that altruism is part of human nature. People do have “other regarding 
sentiments”, they do contribute to public goods from which they benefit little, and 
they do sacrifice for their children and even for others to whom they are not related” 
(p. 29).  
When people sacrifice their life or when they increase the fitness or the 
survival possibility of others in the Titanic disaster, at the expense of their own 
survival chances, we are observing altruistic behavior. Self-sacrifice can be seen as an 
extreme form of altruism. For example, Krebs (1991) stresses: “On my definition of 
altruism, behaviors directed toward the enhancement of the welfare of another 
increase in altruism in proportion to the anticipated costs to self: Risking your life to 
save a drowning person is more altruistic than throwing him or her a lifesaver” (p. 
137). A person could have done better for herself not helping others and therefore 
ignoring the effects of her choice on others (Margolis, 1982). Such a notion is 
consistent with the definition of altruism in social biology (Wilson, 1975).  
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There are various approaches to model altruistic behavior. An altruistic 
individual i would have the following function: 
 
 Ui = Ui (si, sj),         (1) 
 
where si, sj measure the survival probability of i and other individuals j. If i were an 
egoist the utility function only depends on his own survival. This can be modeled 
using the following specific utility function: 
 
j
ij
ijii sssU 

 )(         (2) 
 
ij  is a factor that shows how much individual i cares about j.  If i doesn‟t care at all, 
i‟s utility only depends on the own survival. A positive ij  reflects altruism. The 
utility of i increases when individual j survives. On the other hand, a negative ij  
reflects spite (Sobel, 2005). The utility of i decreases if individual j has a higher 
probability of surviving. The degree of ij  depends on the relation (closeness) 
between i and j. Higher positive values are expected for family members and friends.   
 Personal and societal norms are implicated in altruism (Piliavin and Charng, 
1990). Altruistic motivation may be driven by moral norms such as sharing equitably 
or helping others in distress (Elster, 2006). Norms are the generally accepted 
conditions under which society functions, guiding how individuals act and behave 
towards each other. They are adopted and enforced by members of that society and 
are not always in the best interest of the individual within that society (Elster, 1985). 
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Elster (2007) sees moral norms as unconditional while social norms are conditional 
and therefore influenced by the presence or the behavior of other people (p. 104.). A 
key norm that we are going to explore is “women and children first”. Interestingly, no 
international maritime law requires that women and children are rescued first. Such a 
social norm was first documented during the sinking of HMS Birkenhead in 1852. 
The Birkenhead sank only twenty-five minutes after having struck a rock off the 
South African coast. The seven women and thirteen children onboard were rowed 
away from the wreck to safety. Captain Seton drew his sword ordering men to “stand 
an‟ be still” (Kipling, 1892) to avoid men rushing to the lifeboats putting the life of 
women and children in danger. Similar norms have been found in other areas where 
people had to be evacuated. Humanitarian agencies often first evacuate “vulnerable” 
and “innocent” civilians such as women, children and the elderly. The Geneva 
Convention provides special protection and evacuation priority for pregnant women 
and mothers of young children (Carpenter, 2003).  
 How can we explain that such a social norm may arise? Helping children and 
women as their caregivers serves to strengthen the chances of their survival and 
thereby helps to guarantee the survival of future generations. This may explain why it 
was also considered vital for women to be rescued. Behavioral evidence is consistent 
with the norm of social responsibility. For example, studies report that motorists are 
more willing to stop on a busy street for a woman who is pushing a baby carriage than 
for a woman who is pushing a grocery cart (Harrell, 1994). Helping behavior is also 
exhibited during common threat situations (Batson et al., 1979). An increased level of 
helping behavior may be observed during situations of common threat that may 
generate “we-feelings” and as a consequence a concern for the welfare of others 
(Worman, 1979). In other words closeness strongly correlates to helping behavior 
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(Amato, 1990) and being connected during an external and shocking event may 
induce closeness.  
 Eagly and Crowley (1986) in their meta-study report that traditional male 
gender roles may matter and encourage chivalrous and heroic acts. The results show 
that men may be predisposed to being more helpful than women during situations 
which women judge to be more dangerous than men do. Moreover, women usually 
receive more help than men and males believe themselves to be more competent and 
more comfortable helping than females. This would suggest a higher probability of 
survival among females.  
In addition, sociobiology also stresses the relevance of the “procreation 
instinct”. The survival of a species relies on its progeny; thus a high value must be 
placed upon females of reproductive age as a valuable resource. Social norms may be 
created to protect the reproductive and child-rearing role of women. It is an attempt to 
protect children rather than the desire to help a woman. A potential shortage of 
women would limit the number of offspring, while a shortage of men would not 
(Felson, 2000).  
In humans the period of peak reproduction is between the age of 15 and 35 
(A.S.R.M., 2003). Prior to age 15 females on average are not yet reproductively 
functional and after the age of 35 the reproductive cycle begins to slow until at about 
50 the reproductive function is lost. Others also stress that the emergence of a social 
norm, which gives preference to women, may be related to an increased physical and 
structural vulnerability in women (Felson, 2000). 
Females may also have a strong incentive to guarantee the survival of their 
children. In the study of anthropology “parental investment” is an important concept. 
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The study argues that females of most species invest more in the survival of their 
offspring than males do. Females invest a whole range of benefits, over a period of 
time, on their offspring starting with the gestation period, lactation, predatory 
protection and education (Geary, 1998) whereas a male‟s investment is much smaller. 
Because of this much larger investment the opportunity costs of losing offspring are 
much higher and the drive to ensure offspring survival is therefore much stronger 
(Campbell, 1999). It has been shown that the mortality rates of children with a 
surviving mother are 1.4 times lower than those without (Voland, 1998). The survival 
rates of offspring can be directly linked to maternal survival (Bjorklund and 
Shackelford, 1999). Under these conditions it would be expected that females with 
children would be much more wary of possible danger and would aggressively fight 
other females to ensure a safe haven (Cashdan, 1997).  Moreover, it has been stressed 
that the sex that puts in greater parental investment to promote the prosperity of 
offspring, is the more valued resource (Trivers, 1972; Eswaran and Kotwal, 2004).  
 
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Amato (1990) criticizes that a large amount of literature in this area of helping is 
laboratory-based: “Researchers who value the rigor of the laboratory have been 
reluctant to extend the study of prosocial behaviour to everyday life, where the 
possibility of control is minimal” (p. 31). Working with the Titanic data provides an 
alternative strategy to explore whether “social norms of helping” survive in a real life-
and-death situation. We cannot observe the detailed rescue process but we can 
evaluate the overall outcome, which provides an indication about the level of social 
norms or altruism among crew and passengers.  
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We use a probit model of the survival probability for a typical Titanic passenger: 
 
 Pr(y = 1 | x1, x2, …, xk ) = ( + 1x1 + 2x2 + … + kxk).   (3) 
 
Here y is a dummy variable indicating whether the passenger survived (y = 1) or not 
(y = 0); the variables (x1, x2, …, xk) are explanatory variables such as gender, age, etc; 
(, 1, 2, … k) are parameters to estimate; and  is the cumulative standard normal 
distribution function.  The role of , which is increasing in its argument, is to keep 
the probability Pr(y = 1) in the zero to one interval.  Each passenger contributes one 
observation on (y, x1, x2, …, xk).  From a sample of such observations, assumed 
independent, the parameters can be estimated by maximum likelihood.  This is a 
standard probit model.   
Since the coefficients are difficult to interpret directly, the marginal effect of a 
continuous explanatory variable xj will, as usual, be interpreted through the partial 
derivative 
 
 

Pr(y 1 | x1,x2,...,xk )
x j
  j(  1x1  2x2   kxk ) ,  (4) 
 
evaluated at the means, where  is the standard normal density function (not the 
cumulative density ).  Since  > 0, the sign of the marginal effect is the same as the 
sign of j.  For a discrete xj, a difference rather than a derivative will be used in place 
of (4). 
Tables 1 and 2 present the results.  For each coefficient of each probit, we 
report the maximum likelihood estimates of the coefficient (first value), the z-statistic 
 13 
(ratio of coefficient to its standard deviation, in italics), and the marginal effect (in 
bold).  At the bottom of the table, for each probit, we also report the sample sizes and 
the pseudo-R2s.  The pseudo-R2 is 1–(L1/L0), where L0 is the log-likelihood value for 
the null model excluding all explanatory variables, and L1 is the log-likelihood value 
for the fitted model. 
 Our gender variable (female=1) will be a key factor that we will explore. We 
predict that the coefficient is statistically significant with a positive sign. In addition, 
we will observe whether children and women with children have a higher probability 
to survive. To measure the age range of a child we use the United Nations provisional 
guidelines of standard international age classifications (United Nations, 1982). The 
guidelines classify children as up to the age of 15.  Moreover, to develop further age 
dummies we rely on an age notion that the British Royal Commission used in 1870-74 
and which appeared in a subsequent Act in 1875 in regard to age benefits. The 
transition into “old age” was defined to begin at 50 (e.g. Arias, 2004; Boyer, 1988; 
Eysenck, 2004; Gorsky, 1998). We will also explore whether females in their 
reproductive age are more likely to survive compared to other women. Moreover, we 
will examine (check) whether individuals or females with a larger potential pool of 
helpers (family members) have a higher probability of surviving.  
In addition to controls for gender, age and family or travel group size
1
, we also 
explore the following independent variables: passenger-class, crew member, and 
nationality. The data was generated from numerous sources, in particular the 
Encyclopaedia Titanica. Passengers were separated into three different classes, 
namely: first class, second class and third class. It can be expected that first class 
                                                 
1
 Singles, singles with children, singles with servants, couples, couples with children, couples with 
servants, families/friends, families/friends with children and families/friends with servants. The 
families/friends groups include extended family groups and groups of friends travelling together as a 
party. 
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passengers tried to obtain preferential treatment. A higher level of (bargaining) power, 
better access to information about imminent danger, persons of power and decision 
makers such as leading crew members may facilitate (lead to a better) access to 
lifeboats and therefore raise the probability of survival. Moreover, first class cabins 
were closest to the boat deck. We control for nationality as previous studies on 
helping behavior did report cultural differences (Perlow and Weeks, 2002). Moreover, 
it is worthwhile to explore differences between the crew and the passengers. Crew 
members are better prepared for a catastrophic event and are also in the position of 
obtaining the information earlier than the passengers. They could use this information 
advantage to generate a higher survival rate. They have also better access to important 
resources such as lifeboats. On the other hand, they are restrained by the expectation 
to be among the very last to leave the sinking ship. 
Table 1 presents the empirical results for the first set of estimations. We begin 
by first examining if we can find the expected gender effect. In the first four 
specifications we only include the coefficient FEMALE in the specification, focusing 
on all the individuals on board the Titanic (see specification 1), only passengers (2), 
crew members (3), and couples (4). The results indicate that a strong gender effect 
exists. Being female rather than male increases the probability of surviving between 
23.7% (specification 3) and 53.9% (specification 4). This is a quite substantial 
quantitative effect. Interestingly, females have a lower probability to survive among 
crew member than among passengers. Moreover, we observe that the survival rate of 
females increases when focusing only on couples. In sum, the gender effect is robust 
in all the 11 regression that we present in Table 1. The effect even increases after 
controlling for further factors (specification 5 to 11). 
Table 1 about here  
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In a next step we explore whether children also have a higher probability of 
surviving. In specification (5) we focus only on passengers, controlling for passenger 
class using the age dummies AGE Sub 15 (age 15 and below), AGE 16-50 and AGE 
51+ (which is the reference group) to explore the age-survival relationship. The 
results support the notion that children have a higher probability of survival than other 
age groups reporting the largest marginal effects. Being a child rather than a person 
AGE 51+ (reference group) increases the probability of survival by 32%. Moreover, 
the coefficient AGE 16-50 is also statistically significant. Thus, we find a negative 
relationship between age and survival probability.  
Specification (5) and the following ones in Table 1 also show that first and 
second-class passengers have a higher probability of survival. Being a first class 
passenger as opposed to a third class passenger (which is the reference group) 
increases the probability of survival by about 40%. Thus, more (bargaining) power, 
better access to information and lifeboats increases the probability of survival quite 
substantially.   
In specification (6) we work with the entire data set using a CREW dummy 
variable. The results show that crew-members had a higher probability of survival 
which may indicate their taking advantage of their increased opportunities (better 
possibilities) to acquire resources and to be informed which promoted their survival 
rate. Thus, such a result is more in line with a self-interested approach.  
In a next step specification (7) and in the following ones we explore whether 
having a child increases the survival rate of an individual. This is indeed the case. 
Having a child increases the probability of survival by 20%. This effect in part 
explains not only the social norm of “children first”, but also the parental investment 
norm. Having children motivates parents (especially mothers - women being the main 
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caregivers at that time) to fight harder for their child‟s survival. Helping children 
increases the possibility of guaranteeing the survival of future generations.  
In specification (8) we again focus on couples only. We find that passenger 
class and having children also mattered. In this specification we observe the strongest 
gender effect. A possible explanation could be that husbands and fathers fought to 
secure a place on a lifeboat for their wives and children but perished as they did not 
attain a seat for themselves. Specifications (9) to (11) allow us to explore whether 
being active within a small or large group increases the probability of survival. Joint 
efforts may lead to a higher probability of survival, but they may also lead to a lower 
level of flexibility during critical situations. The results indicate that both coefficients, 
the one for small groups (couples) and large groups (families), are negative. Thus, 
people acting alone have a higher probability of survival. There is even a statistically 
significant difference for the smaller group.  
Finally, in the last two specifications in Table 1 we control for nationality. 
First we include a dummy for the single largest group on board: people from England. 
We find that English people had a lower probability of survival. To deal with the 
heterogeneous structure of the reference group in specification (10) we use people 
from England as the reference group in specification (11) and compare them with 
other nationalities such as the US Americans, Irish, Swedes and the remaining 
countries. Interestingly, the results show that Americans had ceteris paribus the 
highest probability of surviving.  
Next we investigate the survival factors among females. This allows us to test, 
for example, if indeed a higher priority is placed upon females in their prime 
reproductive age. We therefore construct three dummy variables, namely age 16-35, 
age below 16 and age 36+. Table 2 presents the results. The findings indeed indicate 
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that women in their prime reproductive age were more likely to survive. Compared to 
the reference group (age 36+) their probability increases by more than 16% (see 
specification 12). This result remains robust after including further factors (see other 
specifications). 
Table 2 about here  
We again observe a passenger class effect. Table 2 shows that the class 
coefficients report the largest marginal effects. Being a first class passenger increased 
the probability of surviving among women by around 40%. Interestingly, there exists 
no statistically significant difference between children and the reference group. One 
reason could be that several women above the reproductive age may be active as 
caregivers. Specifications (14) to (18) show that having a child increases, ceteris 
paribus, the probability of surviving among women. Interestingly, we observe that 
female crewmembers also had a higher probability of survival. The quantitative 
difference is quite substantial (close to 20%). On the other hand, being in a small 
group (with only a partner) reduces the probability of survival while being part of a 
larger group (family) does not lead to a statistically significant difference in relation 
to women who are travelling alone. Finally, Table 2 shows that nationality does not 
matter. Thus, the advantage of being a US citizen disappears when the focus lies on 
women only.  
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
There has been little evidence available that illuminates whether interdependent 
preferences or prosocial behaviors matter in extreme situations such as life-and-death 
events. This paper tries to address this shortcoming by exploring these questions using 
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data from the sinking of the Titanic. This data set allows us to explore not only the 
behavioral consequences of an extraordinary event, but also provides evidence of an 
individual‟s reaction in a situation where there exists an excess of demand due to the 
shortage of lifeboats. Moreover, the analyzed event can be considered a quasi-natural 
experiment. The environmental or situational conditions were identical for every 
person on board the Titanic. The event can be seen as an external shock that affected 
everyone on board in the same manner. In addition, we can largely exclude that 
potential helping behavior could have been driven by future reciprocity. Such a life-
and death-situation can be seen as a “one-shot game”.  
The results offer strong support for the assumption that social norms and 
altruism matter. The adherence to the norm “women and children first” is apparent in 
such a life and death situation. Being female rather than male increases the probability 
of survival between 23.7% and 53.9%, depending on the specification used. This is a 
large quantitative effect. Interestingly, females had a lower probability to survive 
among crew-members than among passengers. However, the effect is still quite 
substantial (23.7%). Moreover, the survival rate of females increases when focusing 
only on couples. Similarly, being a child rather than a person of AGE 51+ (reference 
group) increases the probability of survival by about 30%. Having a child and being 
of reproductive age strongly raises the survival probability. Having a child also 
increases the probability of survival when males are considered also. Such results are 
in line with socio-biological theories (e.g. procreation instincts or parental investment) 
that were discussed in the theoretical part. The findings are also consistent with 
previous results that report that males are more willing to help in critical situations 
(e.g. chivalrous and heroic behavior). 
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 Social class has a strong effect. Passengers of the first and second class had a 
higher probability of survival. Preferential treatment, a higher level of (bargaining) 
power, better access to information about imminent danger, persons of power and 
decision makers such as leading crew members tend to raise the probability of 
survival as they allow for better access to lifeboats. Moreover, these passengers were 
closer to the boat deck
2
. Similarly, it seems that crew-members used their information 
advantage and their superior access to resources (e.g. lifeboats) to generate a higher 
probability of survival.  
 In sum, the intention of the paper was to investigate the decisions made under 
these extreme conditions and to see if the survival outcomes correspond with the 
literature on interdependent preferences and social norms. Helping behavior is 
common and altruism or social and moral norms seem to play a central role in such a 
risky and extreme situation. For example, social norms such as “women and children 
first” are maintained during such external shocks that create life and death situations. 
Such an effect is only observable when both crew and passengers agree to defer to 
such norms. Otherwise, it would have been easy for male passengers to revolt against 
such a norm.  Actions are guided by norms and rationality in the sense that society 
profits when a large number of females and offspring survive. The social norms are 
strong enough to keep the “public good” problems under control, limiting individual 
self-interested behavior although people also take advantage of their relative situation 
as can be seen by the higher survival rate of crew and first and second class 
                                                 
2
 Unfortunately, there are only very sketchy data on where the cabins of passengers were located on the 
Titanic. We could only collect information on the distance to the lifeboats in meters for 325 persons of 
which 64 percent survived. As the overall survival rate is 32 percent, this sample is likely to be highly 
skewed; that is, the information on the distance to the lifeboats comes predominantly from passengers 
saved. Nevertheless, using this questionable and small sample, the estimates of the determinants 
discussed are robust: the effects of gender, cabin class, and reproductive age remain statistically 
significant and of similar magnitude. 
 
 20 
passengers. Our findings clearly show the importance of working with Richard 
Thaler‟s (2000) notion of a Homo Sapiens able to understand an individual‟s behavior 
in a life-and-death situation.  
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Table 1: Survival Probability and Pro-Social Behavior.  
 
Probit All Passenger Crew Couple Passenger All All  Couples All All All 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
FEMALE 1.413*** 1.462*** 1.858*** 1.477*** 1.469*** 1.493*** 1.488*** 1.702*** 1.517*** 1.509*** 1.512*** 
20.22 18.34 5.50 10.29 17.39 18.29 18.16 9.8 18.11 17.98 17.84 
0.517 0.529 0.237 0.539 0.530 0.542 0.541 0.605 0.550 0.547 0.548 
AGE Sub 15     0.832*** 0.764*** 0.758***  0.745*** 0.745*** 0.753*** 
    4.12 3.94 3.89  3.76 3.75 3.77 
    0.322 0.293 0.291  0.286 0.285 0.289 
AGE 16 - 50     0.474*** 0.416*** 0.445***  0.463*** 0.462*** 0.469*** 
    3.01 2.84 3.01  3.11 3.10 3.14 
    0.162 0.131 0.139  0.143 0.143 0.145 
CREW       0.536*** 0.546***  0.493*** 0.649*** 0.631*** 
     6.51 6.61  5.42 5.62 5.37 
     0.189 0.193  0.174 0.229 0.223 
1
st
 Class     1.149*** 1.140*** 1.122*** 0.833*** 1.194*** 1.173*** 1.136*** 
    10.95 10.92 10.68 3.85 10.91 10.67 9.36 
    0.432 0.429 0.422 0.320 0.448 0.440 0.427 
2
nd
 Class     0.409*** 0.407*** 0.390*** 1.577*** 0.412*** 0.481 0.454*** 
    3.93 3.9 3.72 7.9 3.89 4.34 3.97 
    0.156 0.150 0.144 0.569 0.153 0.179 0.169 
Has Child/ 
Children  
      0.523*** 0.596*** 0.713*** 0.688 0.682*** 
      2.69 2.77 3.39 3.26 3.22 
      0.199 0.234 0.274 0.264 0.261 
Small 
Groups  
        -0.274** 
-0.254 -0.252*** 
(Couples)         -2.47 -2.28 -2.25 
         -0.090 -0.084 -0.084 
Large 
Groups 
        -0.479 
-0.033 -0.023 
(Families)         -0.47 -0.33 -0.22 
         -0.017 -0.012 -0.008 
England 
(1143) 
         -0.201***  
         -2.20  
         -0.070  
Ireland (114)           0.140 
          0.85 
          0.050 
Sweden 
(106) 
          0.068 
          0.40 
          0.024 
USA (424)           0.236** 
          2.18 
          0.085 
All Others 
(399) 
          
0.206* 
           1.89 
           0.040 
Obs. 2186 1300 886 376 1300 2186 2186 376 2186 2186 2186 
Pseudo R2 0.161 0.211 0.041 0.221 0.286 0.209 0.212 0.389 0.214 0.216 0.216 
Notes: z- values in italics, marginal effects in bold. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 2: Survival of Women 
 
Probit Passenger All All Couples All All All 
  (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
AGE Sub15 0.147 0.060 0.086 0.993 -0.011 -0.012 0.054 
0.61 0.25 0.35 1.15 -0.04 -0.05 0.21 
0.044 0.017 0.023 0.089 -0.003 -0.003 0.015 
AGE 16 – 35 0.528*** 0.421** 0.457** 0.272 0.473*** 0.472*** 0.425** 
2.85 2.39 2.55 0.83 2.62 2.60 2.29 
0.169 0.125 0.132 0.048 0.135 0.135 0.121 
CREW Dummy  1.177*** 1.22***  1.007*** 1.014*** 1.031*** 
 3.41 3.54  2.81 2.64 2.66 
 0.200 0.194  0.174 0.175 0.177 
1
st
 Class 1.964*** 2.001*** 1.99*** 2.899*** 2.170*** 2.168*** 2.138*** 
7.96 8.45 8.21 6.04 8.74 8.69 7.89 
0.415 0.403 0.389 0.527 0.408 0.407 0.403 
2
nd
 Class 1.131*** 1.118*** 1.111*** 1.168*** 1.202*** 1.205*** 1.188*** 
6.40 6.37 6.25 3.77 6.43 6.11 5.80 
0.274 0.241 0.231 0.136 0.240 0.241 0.238 
Has Child/Children   1.024** 1.45*** 1.457*** 1.456*** 1.536*** 
  2.37 2.98 3.18 3.17 3.16 
  0.186 0.154 0.215 0.215 0.220 
Small Groups (Couples)     -0.661*** -0.660*** -0.623*** 
    -3.43 -3.40 -3.18 
    -0.197 -0.196 -0.185 
Large Groups (Families)     -0.167 -0.166 -0.154 
    -0.95 -0.94 -0.86 
    -0.047 -0.047 -0.044 
England Dummy      -0.009  
     -0.05  
     -0.003  
Ireland       0.203 
      0.76 
      0.052 
Sweden        -0.413 
      -1.40 
      -0.130 
USA       0.016 
      0.07 
      0.0040 
All Other Nations       0.045 
      0.21 
      0.012 
Obs. 433 482 482 169 482 482 482 
Pseudo R2 0.2198 0.2338 0.2466 0.4505 0.2683 0.2683 0.2761 
Notes: z- values in italics, marginal effects in bold. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table A1: Mean Values 
 
Variables Mean 
Survived  0.319 
FEMALE 0.220 
AGE Sub 15 0.052 
AGE 16 - 50 0.891 
CREW  0.405 
1
st
 Class 0.146 
2
nd
 Class 0.129 
Has Kids  0.031 
Small Groups  0.171 
(Couples)  
Large Groups 0.167 
(Families)  
England 0.529 
Ireland 0.052 
Sweden 0.048 
USA 0.191 
Other Nationalities 0.180 
Female Age 16-35 0.589 
 
 
 
 
 
 
